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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner has not waived his right to claim that 
Administrative Las Judge's (ALJ) factual findings were 
unsupported by the evidence nor that the revocation of 
Petitioner's license was inconsistent with prior agency 
disciplinary action. By its nature, a request for agency review 
of the decision of the ALJ and its adoption by the Real Estate 
Commission is a request that the agency review the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order for consistency with the 
evidence presented. Further, Petitioner's request for agency 
review clearly requests that the Department of Commerce examine 
the record to determine that the Commissions's Order was 
consistent with the evidence and past disciplinary action of the 
Commission. 
Petitioner has not presented more specific evidence to 
support its prima facia case concerning his contention that the 
Commission treated, Petitioner inconsistently with other 
disciplinary matters because the Commission has failed to make 




POINT I; PETITIONER PROPERLY REQUESTED AGENCY REVIEW 
OF THE ALJ#S AND THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS FACTUAL 
FINDINGS AND THEIR ORDER IN LIGHT OF PRIOR DISCIPLINARY 
ACTION AND THEREFOR PRESERVED SAID ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON 
APPEAL. 
Respondent asserts that Petitioner in requesting a review of 
the ALJ and Real Estate Commission's Order did not raise the 
issues of unsupported findings of facts and inconsistent 
disciplinary action by the Commission and therefore waived those 
issues on appeal. Respondents assertion that Petitioner waived 
the issues presented by him in this case is wrong. 
Petitioner requested a review by the Department of Commerce 
under U.C.A. §61-2-12 (1953 as amended) and Utah Administrative 
Code §R151-46b-13. Utah Administrative Code §R151-46b-13 states 
as follows: 
[B]efore seeking judicial review of the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and the order entered in a 
formal adjudication proceeding...an aggrieved party 
shall file a petition requesting agency review within 
3 0 days after the issuance of the order in question. 
In compliance with this section of the Administrative Code, 
on August 1, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition requesting agency 
review of the ALJ and the Real Estate Commissions determination. 
U.A.C. §R151-46b-13 only requires Petitioner to file a 
petition requesting agency review. It makes no mention of 
delineating specific objections to the findings, conclusions or 
order of the ALJ or the Commission. Any review by the Commerce 
Department, therefore, under §R151-46b-13, encompasses a review 
2 
of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order 
prepared by the ALJ and adopted by the Real Estate Commission. 
Consequently, Petitioners filing of his request for agency review 
preserved issues related to the findings of the ALJ being 
unsupported by the evidence presented and the Commission's 
disciplinary action being inconsistent with previous disciplinary 
measures taken by the Commission. 
Although a request for agency review automatically 
encompasses a review of the findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and the order in this matter, Petitioner's request for agency 
review also specifically requested that the Department of 
Commerce review the decision of the ALJ and the Real Estate 
Commission to see if the decision was consistent with prior 
agency action. In his Brief in Support of Petitioner's Request 
for Agency Review (Brief), Petitioner alleged that the Order 
recommended by the ALJ and adopted by the Commission was 
inconsistent with prior agency action. Petitioner's Brief also 
requested the Department of Commerce alter the Order to make it 
consistent with prior disciplinary action of the Commission. 
Petitioner also presented numerous mitigating factors, in 
his Brief, which distinguished Petitioners circumstances from 
other cases in which the Commission had revoked a real estate 
license. For example, in paragraph 16 of his Brief, Petitioner 
stated, 
16. Revocation of the petitioner's real estate 
license is a severe disciplinary sanction. Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the sanction be reviewed and 
a hearing be held on the same, particularly in light 
3 
Of: 
a. Mr. Ostler's admission in his 
initial response addressed to the Department 
of Commerce, Blaine E. Twitchell, Director, 
wherein the Petitioner admits that the 
transaction should have been finalized 
through the brokerage; 
b. Mr. Ostler's motivation to close 
this sale to avoid harm to the Skankeys as 
set forth in Dr. Skankey's deposition; and 
c. There have been no complaints 
received by the Department of Commerce, 
Division of Real Estate, against this 
Petitioner for actions taken by this 
Petitioner since the date of the transaction 
which is the subject matter of the petition 
filed herein. In the interim, the Petitioner 
has worked in the real estate industry. 
In light of the inconsistent disciplinary action taken by 
the Commission, in the prayer for relief of Petitioner's Brief, 
Petitioner requested that the Department of Commerce alter the 
sanctions imposed by the Commission and recommended sanctions he 
believed were in line with previous disciplinary action taken by 
the Real Estate Commission. 
The wording of Petitioner's request for agency review 
requires the Department of Commerce to review the Order of the 
Real Estate Commission for inconsistency with prior Commission 
decisions. Consequently, Petitioner has not waived his right to 
bring the issues presented by him before this Court. 
POINT II; PETITIONER HAS NOT PRESENTED A STRONGER 
PRIMA FACIA CASE AS A RESULT OF RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO 
MAKE AVAILABLE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION RELATED TO PRIOR 
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES TAKEN BY THE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION. 
Respondent has alleged that Petitioner has not presented a 
prima facia case related to his contention that the decision of 
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the Real Estate Commission to revoke his license was inconsistent 
with prior Commission disciplinary actions. Petitioner, admits 
that his prima facia case is not as strong as he would normally 
present to this Court but denies it is insufficient for this 
Court to rule in his favor. Furthermore, any failure of 
Petitioner's prima facia case must be attributed to Respondents 
improper withholding of information related to prior disciplinary 
action of the Real Estate Commission. 
In presenting his contention that the Commission Order was 
inconsistent with its prior conduct, Petitioner attempted to 
acquire information related to prior cases and decisions made by 
the ALJ and Real Estate Commission. Petitioner contacted the 
Commission concerning prior cases and decisions and was informed 
that the requested information was only made publicly available 
through a newsletter published quarterly by the Commission. 
Petitioner reviewed issues of the newsletter and determined that 
the information provided therein, with regard to previous 
disciplinary action taken by the Commission, was anecdotal and 
incomplete in providing the necessary information to this Court. 
Notwithstanding a reasonable search, Petitioner was unable 
to locate any additional source for information related to prior 
disciplinary action taken by the Commission. Since the desired 
information is within the complete control of Respondent and is 
not properly available to Petitioner, Respondent should not be 
entitled to object to Petitioner's prima facia case. 
Furthermore, Respondent should be required to make available to 
5 
the Court complete records of prior disciplinary actions taken by 
the Real Estate Commission within a reasonable period of time. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised before the Court by Petitioner's appeal, 
namely, was the ALJ's findings and conclusions supported by the 
evidence and was the Real Estate Commissions sanction of 
Petitioner consistent with previous disciplinary action, were 
properly presented to the Department of Commerce for review, and 
therefore, were not raised by Petitioner. Moreover, Petitioner 
has presented the necessary prima facia case for this Court to 
find that the Commission's sanction of Petitioner, was 
inconsistent with previous disciplinary action. Petitioner 
intention of presenting further evidence in this regard was 
impeded by Respondents failure to make information concerning 
other disciplinary actions available to Petitioner. 
Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that this 
Court determine that the findings of the ALJ and Real Estate 
Commission were unsupported, and that the Commission's sanction 
of Petitioner was inconsistent with prior disciplinary action 
taken by the Commission. Furthermore, Petitioner respectfully 
requests that this Court reinstate his real estate broker 
license. 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court schedule 
oral arguments in this matter. 
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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. The foreign judgment is not 
entitled Full Faith and Credit until it is properly filed and 
domesticated in Utah. It is unlawful to go to the police to 
enforce a foreign judgment prior to filing the foreign judgment 
in a Utah court. The foreign court is NOT a court of general 
jurisdiction in Utah. It is a federal court created by statute 
and granted jurisdiction ONLY by statute, which statutory 
jurisdiction has not been found. The foreign jurisdiction 
judgment can be attack in this quiet title action on grounds 
of fraud, lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process. The 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction. 
Defendant's arguments are in violation of the law, opposed to 
previous decisions of higher courts without grounds, outrageous 
or false. 
II. ARGUMENT. 
(a) ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC JUDGMENTS 
DISTINGUISHED. Defendant appears to argue only that foreign 
judgments and domestic judgments are precisely the same as to 
procedure and enforcement within Utah. We now distinguish 
between foreign judgments and domestic judgments to prove (as 
admitted by Defendant) the law has not been followed and actions 
of Defendant were clear violations of our rights to due process 
of law. 
Our argument is on the basis of clearly established law 
and precedent which we, in good faith, rely upon for our appeal 
and petition. Thus, we deny that our appeal is frivolous and 
allege that Defendant's Brief and arguments are frivolous, in 
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violation of the law, and in clear violation of our rights to 
due process of law. 
We request the court NOTICE that none of the cases cited 
by Defendant concern themselves with foreign judgments, full 
faith and credit, or enforcement proceedings of foreign judgments 
within Utah. Defendant would have us believe that enforcement 
of foreign judgments in Utah is automatic. This is clearly 
false under the law in Utah. DEFENDANT IS DELIBERATELY OFF 
POINT. 
The cases which are on point are the cases upon which we 
rely, Holm v Smilowitz, 840 P2d 157 (Utah App. 1992); Pan Energy 
v Martin, 813 P2d 1142 (Utah 1991); Data Management Systems 
v EDP Corp, 709 P2d 377.6^ 'f*S~) 
Defendant admits at p. 10 that the U.S. District Court 
judgment is a FOREIGN JUDGMENT which must seek full faith and 
credit to be enforced in Utah and is so defined in Utah Code, 
78-22a-2(2). 
The court teaches that a foreign judgment can not be 
enforced in another jurisdiction until it has been domesticated. 
"An order of a judge in one state is simply not enforceable 
in another state until that order has been domesticated 
in the second state.11 Holm, supra, p. 163 
It is most distressing to see Defendant continue to refute 
the law and prior decisions of the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court sustaining the law, which decisions are on point 
and applicable in this civil action. 
Defendant claims the foreign judgment is automatically 
enforceable in Utah. The Appeals Court disagrees, stating that 
^2. 
with regard to full faith and credit, 
"...it is equally clear that a foreign judgment must first 
be filed in Utah in order for it to become an enforceable 
Utah order, and furthermore, that the parties are, in most 
circumstances, entitled to a hearing on the foreign order 
to examine the narrow issue of whether the other state 
court had jurisdiction when it rendered its order. Neither 
occurred here, resulting in denial of Holm's substantive 
due process rights.11 Holm, supra, p. 163 
The foreign judgment has never been properly filed in the Utah 
Court. We were denied our rights to due process of law on the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court when it rendered its order. 
Judge Mower simply refused to hear and decide our jurisdiction 
arguments, which we believe conclusively proves that the federal 
court could not possibly have jurisdiction over the real property 
nor over our persons nor over the subject matter, point by point, 
when it rendered its judgment. Fraud and lack of due process 
of law in addition to jurisdiction are grounds for attack upon 
the foreign jurisdiction judgment as we have previously shown. 
We attack the foreign judgment on all three grounds. We are 
entitled to a hearing and an unprejudiced finding of fact and 
law on all issues we raised. In the face of the law and previous 
decisions of higher Utah Courts, foreign judgments can be attack 
on these and possibly other grounds (See Data Management, supra, 
at p. 379), Defendant's argument is frivolous. 
"Thus, enforcement of a foreign custody decree pursuant 
to the UCCJA must be accomplished in compliance with 
provisions of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, which governs 
the procedure for ENFORCEMENT OF ALL FOREIGN JUDGMENTS." 
Holm, supra, p. 163, emphasis added. 
We have shown that Defendant went straight to the Richfield 
City police with a criminal trespass complaint to enforce his 
foreign judgment. This is in violation of the law and due process 
>S 
of law. Judge Mower ruled that the word "may" in Utah Code, 
78-22a-2(2) (record p. 128) rendered the foreign judgment act 
voluntary; directly in opposition to higher court decisions. 
The court quotes §78-22a-2(2) and states: "Smilowitz argues 
that the use of "may11 suggests that the method undertaken 
here, simply taking the foreign judgment straight to the 
police, is also an acceptable alternative. We disagree. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the history of the Utah 
Foreign Judgment act in Pan Energy v Martin, 813 P2d 1142, 
1143 (Utah 1991), and noted that its purpose was fto 
simplify the enforcement of foreign judgments by sparing 
the judgment holder the burden of further litigation and 
allowing enforcement in this state by the simple expedient 
of filing the judgment with a county clerk in Utah. The 
judgment holder still has the option, however, to commence 
an enforcement action under the older, tradition approach.' 
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, use of the word "may" merely 
conveys that the judgment holder may file it with a district 
court clerk or use the prior approach, not that he may 
proceed without docketing the judgment whatsoever." Holm, 
supra, footnote 3, p. 163 
Thus, Defendant clearly circumvented the law and violated our 
rights to due process of law by his act of going straight to 
the police with his criminal trespass complaint rather than 
(1) filing the foreign judgment with the clerk of the court 
or (2) commencing an enforcement action in the 6th district 
court. These are the two recognized lawful methods whereby 
a foreign judgment can be enforced in Utah. 
The court continues stating our rights to due process of 
law are mandatory. 
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic 
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate 
to the case and just to the parties involved." Holm, supra, 
p. 164 
"It is well settled that '(a) foreign judgment rendered 
without jurisdiction over the defendant or under 
circumstances which amount to a lack of due process is 
not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah1." Holm, 
supra, p. 164. 
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(b) FEDERAL JURISDICTION V UTAH JURISDICTION. Defendant 
claims that our appearance to defend (p. 12) in federal court 
conferred jurisdiction upon the federal court. That is 
absolutely false. No action or inaction by us could confer 
jurisdiction. (Our brief p. 1213). We were faced with the 
problem of appearing to defend or have summary judgment issued 
against us. Knowing that federal courts have only jurisdiction 
conferred upon them by STATUTE by Congress pursuant to the U.S. 
Constitution, and knowing there was no statute granting such 
jurisdiction over the real property or over our persons, we 
appeared to defend. Each and every appearance in the federal 
court was a "special" not a "general" appearance, each and every 
time denying the jurisdiction of the federal court over Ilafs 
property and over our persons, individually. The record shows 
the issue was never fully litigated or decided or even 
considered. 
Defendant claims (p. 10) Art III, Section 2, CI. 1 confers 
jurisdiction over our persons and Ila's property but as usual 
it is misquoted. 
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and 
ec.uity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made 
under their authority;..." Art III, Sec 2, CI 1, U.S. 
Constitution. 
Defendant fails to state the portion of the U.S. Constitution 
or the laws of the United States which grants jurisdiction over 
real property located in Richfield, Utah. There are only two 
possibilities, none of which apply. (1) Art. IV, Sec 3, Cl 
2, grants federal jurisdiction over territories. Federal 
:> a 
jurisdiction was ousted in 1896 when Utah ceased to be a 
territory and became a State on an equal footing with all other 
states. (2) Art I, Sec 8, CI 17 grants exclusive jurisdiction 
to the federal government over lands purchased with the consent 
of the state legislature and accepted by Congress. The real 
property was not federally purchased by the consent of the Utah 
Legislature and therefore, does not apply. Jurisdiction runs 
to real property and the persons residing thereon. Therefore, 
the federal government could not possibly have jurisdiction 
over Ila's property nor over our persons individually. Defendant 
fails to prove federal jurisdiction. Defendant admits (p. 
9) that court jurisdiction can be challenged at any time. 
Defendant then claims that §1332 grants jurisdiction to 
the federal court by quoting, MThe District Court shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions...11 As usual, 
Defendant falsely quotes the law, attempting to broaden 
jurisdiction far beyond congressional intent and constitutional 
authority, as seen in the law itself. 
11
 (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds 
the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs and is between (1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in 
which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional 
parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) 
of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or 
^ ^ of different states " 28 USQ §1332.,
 n , . „ n . . Defendant, through his attorney,—deliberately lied claiming 
that §1332 is a grant of general federal jurisdiction in Utah 
when it is a highly qualified jurisdictional grant having 
absolutely no application to the instant action. The section 
sc 
actually grants a portion of federal jurisdiction in Art III, 
Sec 2, CI 1 of the U.S. Constitution with other jurisdiction 
going to other federal courts. 
We request the COURT TAKE NOTICE (1) that this 
jurisdictional point was not raised in the lower court and (2) 
that there is no statement of federal jurisdiction on the record. 
The federal court failed to find jurisdiction. The Utah court 
and Defendant failed to find any statutory federal court 
jurisdiction. Federal court jurisdiction is entirely statutory, 
can not be presumed, and when challenged must be proven by the 
party alleging federal jurisdiction. Defendant is grasping 
at straws having no factual or lawful ground to prove federal 
jurisdiction. 
"Only when the question of a sister state's (in the instant 
action, U.S. District Court's) jurisdiction is fully and 
fairly litigated in the foreign court, does such judgment 
have a res judicata effect on the matter of jurisdiction 
in Utah." Holm, supra, p. 164. 
Thus, Defendant's claim of res judicada is false. The fact 
that Christensen relies solely upon a foreign judgment for his 
claim, immediately raises SUBSTANTIAL JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS 
which must be fully litigated. Relying upon the Holm case, 
it appears that the matter must be referred back to the U.S. 
District Court for a determination, at law, of the jurisdiction 
of the federal court. It is obvious from the record that the 
issues we raise here were never decided, otherwise, a 
jurisdictional statement of fact and law would appear on the 
record addressing each and every element of the judgment. 
Next (p. 11), Defendant claims federal jurisdiction under 
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28 USC §125. This is not a grant of federal jurisdiction, rather 
is a description of federal court organization having no 
application to the instant action. We challenge federal court 
JURISDICTION not VENUE. 
Next (p. 11), Defendant cites 26 USC §7402, with emphasis 
on NE EXEAT REPUBLICA writ, as a specific grant of general 
federal jurisdiction. 
According to Blackfs Law Dictionary, Rev 4th Ed, NE EXEAT 
REPUBLICIA is a writ issued to prevent a defendant from leaving 
the jurisdiction of the court. No such writ was issued by the 
state or federal court. We were never under the jurisdiction 
of the federal court so we could not possibly leave the federal 
jurisdiction. 
Again, §7402 is not a general grant of federal jurisdiction. 
The actual authority for federal courts to issue writs is under 
28 USC §1651 which states: 
11
 (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate 
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
to the usages and principles of law.11 28 USC §1651 
§7402 is merely a wordy restatement of §1651. Use of federal 
writs are governed by §1651. The writ can only be issued in 
"aid11 of the court's jurisdiction. No federal court or other 
court can issue writs outside of or in excess of its 
jurisdiction. Defendant failed to prove federal court 
jurisdiction. In the absence of jurisdiction, the writ is void. 
Under Utah law and court precedents cited above, the writ 
of execution must be issued in the name of the State of Utah, 
with its court seal, based upon a properly filed foreign judgment 
and directed to the Sevier County Sheriff. The court should 
NOTICE that p. 11 of our brief again informed the Defendant 
of the laws, rules and court precedents concerning foreign 
judgments. Rule 69, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly 
states that, "The procedure on execution, in proceedings 
supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings 
on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the 
practice and procedure of the state in which the district court 
is held.11 The Defendant now appears before this court (as he 
did in the lower court) advocating that the court ignore or 
nullify Utah law, relying on court cases which are off point. 
The court should notice that §7402 does NOT authorize a 
federal writ of execution. That would be in violation of Rule 
69, supra, recognizing that such a writ must comply with Utah 
law and procedure as we have clearly detailed. 
Defendant claims (p. 11 )"...enforcement of Internal Revenue 
laws...11 The court should NOTICE, there in nothing in the record 
stating which "internal revenue laws11 are being enforced. 
Therefore, the court can only conclude there is no law being 
enforced. 
We further distinguish between enforcement of domestic 
and foreign judgments. Utah Code, 78-22-1 governs domestic 
judgments stating that when a judgment of a Utah district court 
is docketed in another Utah county district court, the judgment 
becomes a lien of the property of the judgment debtor and 
enforceable. The Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code, 
78-22a-2 (1 ) , et seq similarly establishes a lien on the judgment 
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debtor's property upon the docketing of the foreign judgment 
with the appropriate county court. However, the judgment 
docketing requires notice and can not be enforced until 30 days 
after the docketing. Further, the foreign judgment must seek 
f,full faith and credit11, an additional step not required in 
domestic judgments. The higher courts have ruled that when 
a foreign judgment was fraudulent, the foreign court lacked 
jurisdiction or the foreign preceding lacked due process of 
law the judgment is VOID and need not be accorded full faith 
and credit. Only when the sister jurisdiction's proceeding 
is shown to comply with these conditions is the foreign judgment 
accorded full faith and credit. (See Holm, supra, p. 164) Also 
the Supreme Court rejects Defendant's argument that the foreign 
judgment is immune from collateral attack. 
"The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent a 
judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a foreign 
judgment on the ground of fraud or the want of jurisdiction 
or due process of law. (citations) Data Management systems 
v EDP Corp, 790 P2d 377 (Utah 1985) at p. 379 
Defendant's claims on p. 15 are obviously made, knowingly, in 
direct opposition to the higher court decision. 
(c) DEFENDANT'S CASES AND FACTS ARE OFF POINT. Defendant 
deliberately creates confusion by citing cases which are OFF 
POINT. His cases were decided prior to the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act of 1982 and are Utah cases decided in Utah courts. Foreign 
and domestic judgments have different rules. 
Defendant relies upon Intermill v Nash, 75 P2d 157, at 
p. 13. This was a quiet title action in which both plaintiff 
and defendant were under Utah court jurisdiction. The case 
C?o 
was litigated in the District Court of Salt Lake County. Full 
Faith and Credit was not required as it is in this instant 
action. This case has no application here. 
Defendant relies upon Bawden v Pearce, 414 P2d 578, at 
p. 14. Again, the property and parties are within Utah and 
apparently within the jurisdiction of a Utah court. This is 
not a foreign judgment case and has no application here. 
Defendant relies upon Olsen v Board of Education, 571 P2d 
1336 (Utah 1977), at p. 15. This was a condemnation proceeding 
in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. Again, this 
has no application here because it did not involve a foreign 
judgment which must secure Full Faith and Credit to be enforced 
in Utah. 
Defendant relies upon Edmonston v Sisk, 156 F2d 300 at 
p. 15. We are at a loss to know why this case was cited. It 
is an old case decided in 1946. The case relies upon 28 USC 
§838 (See p. 302). §838 has apparently been repealed as we 
can not find it in the federal code. The law governing foreign 
judgments and Full Faith and Credit was enacted in 1982. 
Therefore, that case is unreliable. 
Defendant's "Statement of Facts11 p. 4, clearly and openly 
admits that Defendant violated the laws of Utah and failed to 
follow the long settled procedure for enforcing foreign judgments 
in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has settled the procedural 
issue of enforcing foreign judgments. If the Defendant wants 
his foreign judgment enforced in Utah he must either (1) file 
his foreign judgment in compliance with the Utah Foreign Judgment 
act or (2) commence an enforcement action under the older 
traditional approach. (See Holm, supra, footnote 3, p. 163.) 
It appears, no other approach is lawfully acceptable in Utah. 
Higher courts have already decided that going to the police 
before properly filing and litigating the foreign judgment in 
a Utah Court is unlawful and a violation of our rights to due 
process (Holm, supra, p. 163). 
Defendant makes two false statements on p. 10. (1) The 
foreign judgment WAS entitled to full faith and credit. This 
is false because the foreign judgment must be properly filed 
before it can gain full faith and credit in Utah and survive 
jurisdictional, fraud and due process attacks. (2) The federal 
court is a court of general jurisdiction in Utah. This is false 
because every federal court other than the Supreme Court is 
a court of LIMITED JURISDICTION, having only statutory 
jurisdiction granted by Congress (our brief, p. 26-7). The 
record is silent as to the alleged statutory jurisdiction and 
should be judged lacking or, at least, not fully litigated. 
Defendant's Facts 1 and 2 are in clear violation of Rule 
69(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). 
Defendant's Fact 3 is in clear violation of the long settled 
rule, "An order of a judge in one state (foreign jurisdiction 
in the instant action) is simply not enforceable in another 
state (Utah) until that order has been domesticated in the second 
state." Holm, supra, at 163. Judge Jenkins has never found 
his statutory jurisdiction to act. Even if we granted him the 
widest possible jurisdictional latitude, and if Defendant could 
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prove statutory jurisdiction, he could ONLY ISSUE JUDGMENT 
against L. Shyrl Brown. There is no lien on the record to 
foreclose. All other acts, the sale, foreclose the lien which 
does not exist, and the execution must proceed in a Utah Court, 
under the authority of a Utah Court and under the laws of Utah. 
Defendant's other facts are irrelevant or immaterial because 
Judge Jenkins clearly acted outside of his jurisdiction and 
in violation of Utah and federal laws, as did the United States 
Marshal. LET THE BUYER BEWARE. The unlawful acts of 
Christensen, Judge Jenkins and Marshal Davis can not create 
a lawful interest in Ila's real property. Their acts are void 
and fraudulent. 
(d) JURISDICTION. Procedure with our PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF MANDAMUS is governed by Rule 19, URAP not as Defendant 
claims at p. 7. Our original appeal was for a Writ of Mandamus 
and not intended as an Appeal of Right. The rule requires filing 
with the court, service upon the judge and interested parties. 
All requirements were complied with. The court should NOTICE 
that the Petition has not been timely answered nor contradicted 
in any manner by any person. The court should grant the writ 
and require decision on the numerous issues of Utah and Federal 
law we raised before Judge Mower. 
The original intent of the NOTICE OF APPEAL was to obtain 
a WRIT OF MANDAMUS from the Court of Appeals to compel Judge 
Mower to NOTICE THE LAW and to DECIDE ALL ISSUES OF LAW raised 
by Plaintiffs. 
Judge Mower circumvented the several issues of law by 
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falsely interpreting Utah Codey 78-22a-2(2). See record p. 
128. He stated, "The Utah Foreign Judgment Act is not mandatory. 
It is permissive." This directly contradicts previous decisions 
of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals as we have shown above. 
The foreign judgment MUST first be filed in Utah for it to become 
an enforceable Utah order. This mandatory language is found 
in Holm, supra, p. 163, also see footnote 3. Judge Mower's 
statement, "Hence, it is not exclusive." is correct in that 
the Supreme Court settled the interpretation in Pan Energy v 
Martin, 813 P2d at 1143 deciding "may" would give Christensen 
two methods of enforcing his foreign judgment in Utah. (1) 
The foreign judgment could be filed in compliance with Utah 
Code, 78-22a-1, et seq or (2) Christensen could commence an 
older, traditional method by commencing an enforcement action. 
Christensen's acts in the instant action are condemned and in 
violation of due process of law by the courts1 stating, 
"Thus, use of the word 'may1 merely conveys that the 
judgment holder may file it with a district court clerk 
or use the prior approach, not that he may proceed without 
docketing the judgment whatsoever." Holm, supra, at p. 
163, footnote 3. 
Judge Mower further ruled (record p. 128) that Judge Jenkins 
could execute his own judgments, was not required to follow 
Utah law and to rule otherwise would leave that court potentially 
powerless to enforce federal laws in Utah. We are not talking 
about enforcing federal laws (none are cited), the discussion 
is enforcing a foreign judgment. Judge Mower's decision is 
in direct opposition to decisions of higher Utah courts. (a) 
The judgment must be filed to be enforceable, (b) All foreign 
judgment enforcement in Utah is governed by the Foreign Judgment 
Act. (c) A foreign judge can not enforce his judgment in Utah. 
(d) A foreign judgment must be filed and domesticated to be 
enforceable. (e) U.S. Court judgments are not exempt from the 
general rules, rather, have legal status not distinguishable 
from Florida, New York or Ohio judgments. 
Id. p 163. 
Our desire was to have all issues of fact and law decided 
in the lower court to prevent multiple appeals. 
We recognize the court has wide procedural latitude, in 
the interest of justice, to hear and decide the issues. The 
court has not decided whether to hear the appeal as a Petition 
for Writ of Mandamus or as an Appeal of Right. The Petition 
was filed. The Notice was filed. The court requested a brief 
be filed. It was timely filed. We have complied with rules, 
procedures and court requests to the best of our ability. We 
believe Christensenfs Argument, point 1, frivolous. 
(e) DEFENDANT'S FALSE OR UNSUPPORTED CLAIMS. 
Christensen claims, p. 11, "...enforcement of Internal 
Revenue laws.*.11 Which internal revenue law is being enforced? 
Is it 26 USC §5001? Or another internal revenue law? The record 
is silent. The claim is unsupported. 
Christensen claims, p. 11, "...The...Federal...Court...did 
have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.'1 
Christensen claims, p. 11, that 28 USC §1332 granted that 
jurisdiction. No other statutory jurisdictional grant is cited. 
We show above that §1332 has no application to the instant 
action. The claim is false. 
Christensen claims, p. 12, the federal court Mhad general 
authority to adjudicate interests as between the Defendants 
in real property and to issue such supervised orders of sale 
or execution as were requires." Christensen relies upon 26 
USC §1332 for jurisdictional authority as no other statutory 
authority is cited. We have shown above that enforcement of 
the foreign judgment in this manner is in direct violation of 
Utah law and procedure. The statement is unsupported and false. 
Christensen claims, p. 12, "Appellants argue the judgment 
was not valid against them basically because it was oppressive 
and cite many federal cases which do not appear to be relevant.M 
(a) The court should NOTICE, the judgment, Christensenfs Appendix 
A-3, has never been properly filed. We show above the court 
can not CONSIDER the judgment until properly filed (Holm, supra, 
p. 163). Beyond that, and if the court reverses the Holm court, 
(b) The court should NOTICE, the judgment was against L. Shyrl 
Brown, not against "them". (c) The court should NOTICE, the 
property is owned by Ila, not "them". (d) We will contest 
the validity of the judgment as being fraudulent, issued lacking 
jurisdiction and lack of due process of law, if it ever is 
properly filed in a Utah court for enforcement. (e) The court 
should NOTICE, it is impossible to reply to Christensen1s claim 
that many federal cases are not relevant. No cases are cited 
as irrelevant, therefore, the statement is false. 
Christensen claims, p. 12, The federal court "...supervised 
an Order of Execution over the subject property." Whether or 
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not the federal court supervised the execution and sale is 
irrelevant. We show above that these acts were in direct 
violation of Utah law and procedure. 
Christensen claims, p. 16, we seek an extraordinary writ 
directing Judge Mower to make decisions contrary to law. This 
statement is OUTRAGEOUS AND FALSE. We seek the Mandamus to 
compel Judge Mower to decide the issues of law presented to 
him. If we disagree, our course of action would be to seek 
relief in the higher courts. We CERTAINLY and ABSOLUTELY do 
NOT seek an order to make decisions contrary to law. Rather, 
we seek decisions in HARMONY WITH THE LAW. We believe we show 
above that Judge Mower unlawfully and falsely interpreted Utah 
Code, 78-22a-2(2) 
III. CONCLUSION. The courts look with great disfavor upon 
briefs not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law, or other improper purpose. Christensen's brief 
appears to fit neatly into the definition of frivolous brief. 
We believe we have destroyed every argument of Defendant. 
We believe we correctly represent the authorities on the instant 
subject matter. We summarize that which we have previously 
proven by argument, the law and previous decisions of higher 
Utah Courts on the subject of foreign judgments. Christensen*s 
judgment is clearly a foreign judgment as defined by law. Under 
the law, Christensen must either file his judgment in compliance 
with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act or commence an enforcement 
action to deprive Ila of her property. This governs enforcement 
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procedure of all foreign judgments in Utah. U.S. District Courtfs 
legal status within Utah, as defined by Utah law, is precisely 
the same as Missouri or Iowa or any other jurisdiction entitled 
to Full Faith and Credit in Utah. A foreign judgment must be 
properly filed in Utah before Utah will recognize and enforce 
it. Christensen violated the law and due process by going FIRST 
to the police to enforce his foreign judgment. Foreign judges 
can not enforce their judgments within Utah. All foreign 
judgments must survive collateral challenges as to jurisdiction, 
fraud and due process of law in Utah. This has been denied 
by Judge Mower due to his false interpretation of the law. 
Judge Mower's decision and grant of summary judgment is 
in clear violation of the law, previous decisions of the higher 
courts and due process of law. There are numerous issues of 
law which remain undecided in the lower court, a further 
violation of due process of law. 
Therefore, the court should grant our requested relief. 
Christensen has had notice of the lawful procedure for 
enforcing his foreign judgment for more than six (6) months 
and continues to refuse to properly file the judgment for 
enforcement. He has also had notice of the applicable law and 
cases. He knows that going first to the police before filing 
his foreign judgment is a violation of law and practice in Utah. 
All of his actions strongly suggests contempt for the law and 
higher court decisions and are designed to harass Plaintiffs, 
cause needless delay and needless increase in cost of litigation. 
.'1,/ 
Ila Dell Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I mailed two copies of this document to Tex R. Olsen, 
Attorney, P.O. Box 100, Richfield, Utah, 84701, postage prepaid, 
U.S. Mail, on December 3f , 1994. 
eonard Shyrl Brown 
<o1 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
Attorney for T. Morris Ostler 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 64603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ) PETITION REQUESTING 
of T. MORRIS OSTLER to act AGENCY REVIEW 
as a Real Estate Broker ) 
) Case No. RE90-10-01 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, T. Morris Ostler, pursuant to 
U.C.A. §61-1-12 (1953 as amended) and the Utah 
Administrative Code §R151-46b-13, by and through his counsel 
of record Thomas W. Seiler of ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER and 
requests Agency Review of the Order dated July 6, 1994 which 
revoked his license to act as a Real Estate Broker in the 
State of Utah. This petition is accompanied by a brief in 
support of grounds for review. Petitioner, further requests 
oral argument be heard as to the merits of the review. 
DATED this J__ day of August, 1994/^ 
T. MORRIS OSTLER 
ROBINSON, SEILEK & GLAZIER 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR AGENCY REVIEW was 
mailed, with postage prepaid thereon, on the I S K day of 
August, 1994, to the following: 
Shelly K. Wismer 
Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
163 East 3 00 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Utah Real Estate Commission 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Paul Grant 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Sander J. Mooy 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Constance White 
Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
163 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
g:river*\l±tigati\9513A.pet 
O.Jk 
THOMAS W. SEILER (#2910) 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
Attorney for T. Morris Ostler 
80 North 100 East 
P. o. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
of T. MORRIS OSTLER to act ) PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR 
as a Real Estate Broker ) AGENCY REVIEW 
) 
) Case No. RE90-10-01 
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Code R151-46b-
13, Petitioner T. Morris Ostler hereby submits his Brief in 
Support of Petioners Request for Agency Review of the above-
entitled matter. 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner is presently licensed to practice 
as a real estate broker in Utah. He was initially licensed 
as a sales agent in 1975. Petitioner became a licensed broker 
in October 1987 and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah 
County from a\ lefts!1. November 198 9 to January J 8, 1990. 
During that time, Petitioner's principal broker was Shane 
Luck. 
2. __. November 28, 1989, Petitioner prepared an 
earnest money sales agreement, whereby Gidalthi 0. Ojeda D 
offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and 
Alice Skankey. Petitioner received $500.00 earnest money, 
which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust 
account. The Skankeys accepted the offer. Help-U-Sell was 
to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the sale of the home. 
Petitioner's commission, payable from that amount, would total 
$1,110.00. 
3. Help-U-Sell had full control of the $500.00 
earnest money deposited in its trust account and ultimately 
delivered the same back to the Skankeys. The Petitioner 
tendered the balance of Help-U-Sell's commission to Help-U-
Sell, which tender was refused. 
4. Petitioner's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was 
terminated on January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction 
was not closed as of that date. 
5. Prior to terminating Petitioner's affiliation 
with the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if 
Petitioner had any transactions which were still pending. At 
that time the Skankey-Ojeda transaction appeared as though it 
would not close. This information was given to Mr. Luck. 
6. Petitioner's license was inactivated January 
18, 1990 and remained in that status for approximately three 
(3) weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, 
effective February 10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by 
the Commission (Case No. E89-06-10)• 
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7* On January 20, 1990 t hr Skankeys executed a 
warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the property to the 
Ojedas. On January 22, 1990 an all-inclusive trust deed was 
executed by the Ojedas and notarized by the Petitioner. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the closing occurred on 
January 22# 1990, some four days after the Petitionees 
license was inactivated. 
8. On or about February 16, 1990, Petitioner 
tendered an $840.00 check to Help-U-Sell. The February 16, 
1990 check represented the selling fee which would have been 
retained by the brokerage less the earnest money still on 
deposit. By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck 
returned the closing documents In Petitioner, advised 
Petitioner that the Skankeys had been informed Petitioner 
would have the closing documents and informed Petitioner that 
the Skankeys wanted "theii rlosing documents and money 
immediately11 and a "settlement on the January rent prorations 
with Ojeda." 
9. Help-U-Sell was unwilling to close this 
transaction. The Skankeys (sellers) and the Ojedas (buyers) 
were extremely anxious to cause the sale to go forward. In 
the absence of the sale the Skankeys believed they would be 
significantly damaged. Indeed, Dr. Skankey testified in his 
deposition conducted on Friday, June 4, 1993 at page 31, lines 
12 through 16: 
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Q: So, Dr. Skankey# our question is, is that 
if you assume for a minute that the Ojeda 
sale didn't take place, and no one 
followed through on it, would that have 
been harmful to you? 
A: Yes. 
10. The Respondent disbursed all funds due the 
Skankeys (sellers) on February 16, 1990. Mr. Luck 
subsequently sent the earnest money deposit to the Skankeys. 
11. Neither the Skankeys nor the Ojedas suffered 
any damaged by reason of the Petitioner's action in closing 
this transaction. 
12. The Petitioner was motivated to close this sale 
as a result of his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the 
Skankeys in their desire to complete this transaction. 
13. In light of the determination by the 
Administrative Law Judge (J. Steven Eklund) that the closing 
occurred on January 22, 1990, four (4) days after the 
Petitioner's associate broker's license was inactivated, the 
Petitioner could have re-activated his own principal broker's 
license, prior to the closing date, and completed this 
transaction. The transaction would have been no different had 
this license been reactivated, but rather, would have been 
consummated in the identical manner it was in fact 
consummated. 
14* The only person or entity claiming any damage 
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in this matter is a claim by Mr. Luck on behalf of Help-U-
Sell for lost business. The broker1 s portion of the 
commission was either controlled by Help-U-Sell (in the form 
of the $500.00 Help-U-Sell earnest money deposit) or tendered 
to Help-U-Sell (in the form of a check in the amount of 
$840.00 delivered by Petitioner to Help-U-Sell). 
15. The recommended order as prepared by the 
Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitionees license as 
a real estate broker be revoked. The Utah Real Estate 
Commission confirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order as prepared by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
16. Revocation of the Petitionees real estate 
license is a severe disciplinary sanction. Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the sanction be reviewed and a 
hearing be held on the same, particularly in light of: -
a. Mr. Ostler's admission in his initial 
response addressed to the Department of Commerce, 
Blaine E. Twitchell, Director, wherein the 
Petitioner admits that the transaction should have 
been finalized through the brokerage; 
b. Mr. Ostler's motivation to close this sale 
to avoid harm to the Skankeys as set forth in Dr. 
Skankey's deposition; and 
c. There have been no complaints received by 
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the Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate, 
against this Petitioner for actions taken by this 
Petitioner since the date of the transaction which 
is the subject matter of the petition filed herein. 
In that interim, the Petitioner has worked in the 
real estate industry. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests that the Order 
of July 6, 1994 be reviewed and, upon review, that the 
sanctions imposed therein be amended to a three (3) month 
suspension and a fine of not more than $1,000.00. To the 
extent it is within the Executive Director's authority, it may 
be appropriate to, rather than amending the entire sanction, 
suspend the sanction for the purpose of putting the Petitioner 
on a probationary status for one year or such other time 
period as to the Commission may seem appropriate. It is 
further requested that the sanction not be invoked until such 
time as this matter may be heard on the merits. 
DATED this _/_ day of August. 1994. 
T. MORRIS OSTLER 
Petitioner 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
THOMAS W. SEILER"^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION was, 
mailed, with postage prepaid thereon, on the 1ST day of-Jaiyt 
1994, to the following: 
Shelly K. Wismer 
Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
163 East 300 South 
P. O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Utah Real Estate Commission (7 copies) 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Paul Grant 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Sander J. Mooy 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Constance White 
Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
163 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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